The supersizing phenomenon where menu prices for large fast food portions appear to be well below their marginal production costs is of considerable scholarly and policy interest. This article develops su¢ cient conditions, for a subset of cases where the single-crossing condition is violated, under which a …rm can separate two di¤erent rational consumer types while maximizing and capturing the total surplus associated with marginal-cost pricing. Menu prices can be very easily determined for these cases unlike the complex solutions found under more general conditions. For our subset, the separating equilibrium creates an apparent supersizing discount even though the …rm does not actually sell the additional quantity below marginal cost. With public health interest in reducing portion sizes, we introduce the right-to-split as a policy alternative that breaks the separating equilibrium and leads to smaller quantities.
The Model
Before developing a formal model, we start with a numerical example of a …rm with residual monopoly power 1 facing two types of consumers: low demand (L) and high demand (H). The …rm cannot identify consumer types but knows only their proportions. Assume for simplicity that there is one L-consumer and one H-consumer with inverse demand functions:
P L = 5 q L and P H = 2 0:1q H Also, for simplicity, assume a constant marginal cost of $1 per unit.
To …nd the menu prices that maximize pro…ts, this …rm can act as a perfect price discriminator or equivalently establish menu prices by …rst …nding quantities where P = M C for each type. It is easily
shown that when P = $1 then q L = 4 and q H = 10 with respective consumer surpluses of $8 and $5. By appropriating these surpluses, the menu prices (T P i i 2 fL; Hg) for the 4 and 10 unit menu quantities 2 are T P L = $12 and T P H = $15. The respective pro…t margins, $8 and $5, correspond to the consumer surpluses.
Critically, in this case, the H-type will not pretend to be a L-type because he is not willing to pay $12
for 4 units. The maximum he is willing to pay, the area below his demand curve, is $7:2. Similarly, the L-type will not pretend to be an H-type as her bene…t from the H-type quantity is $12:5 which falls short of its $15 price. The …rm has successfully separated the two types and also maximized the total surplus.
Our primary interest, however, lies with the quantity discount. For an additional $3, H-types get 6 more units, paying $0:5 for each additional unit relative to the L-types. This is well below the $1 production cost.
3
Through the following general linear formulation (nonlinear extensions do not add insight), we examine the su¢ cient conditions for such results which create the illusion that producers are selling below marginal cost. 1 The substantial markups for McDonalds and Burger King described by Thomadsen (2007, p.5) suggest considerable monopoly power for the major fast food brands. Armstrong and Vickers (2010) develop a theoretical duopoly model in which the two …rms adopt non-linear pricing and bundling, and DG's appendix shows that their results hold in a Hotelling-type model. Locay and Rodriguez (1992) provide examples where even highly competitive …rms can price discriminate. 2 It is these quantities that determine the H and L labels for this example in which the SCC is violated.
3 Elsewhere, the rational addiction approach to pricing developed by Richards, Patterson, and Hamilton (2007) is predicated on pricing power for the fast food industry. They show that addictive foods, sugar-…llled and high in fat, will be priced below marginal cost. More general work by Hitt and Chen (2005) also develops situations in which price can be less than marginal cost.
For our formal analysis, we continue with two types of consumers L and H, where is the proportion of the L-type and (1 ) of the H-type. Their inverse demand functions are:
This is a critical and nonstandard assumption 4 that will lead to a violation of the single-crossing condition (SCC), i.e., the Spence-Mirrlees condition.
The extensive literature on menu pricing builds on Maskin and Riley's (1984) characterization of nonlinear monopoly pricing that satis…es the SCC. However, we found only limited analyses of menu pricing when the SCC is violated. Andersson (2005) develops conditions under which relaxation of the SCC will still produce the Makin-Riley results, but he also (Andersson, 2008) provides a counterexample to the main MaskinRiley result, namely that the quantities for both types can correspond to those under marginal-cost pricing with gains for both consumer-types that are zero. Chao and Nahata (2015) de…ne the region in which the quantities for the two types, under various possibilities that violate the SCC, correspond to the e¢ cient quantities (marginal-cost pricing) as well as where the quantity for one can exceed or fall short of the e¢ cient quantity. They also provide more speci…c results for two crossing linear demands that build on Nahata Kokovin and Zhelobodko (2002) . In a recent survey on general nonlinear pricing, Armstrong (2015, p. 15) states: "Demand curves might be linear, say, but consumers di¤er both in the slope and the intercept of demand. Such problems can often be easily solved using the demand pro…le approach, but are very di¢ cult to solve using a "mechanism design" approach which focuses on preference parameters."
5
We respond to this challenge by circumventing the need to maximize a pro…t function with nonlinear and nonmonotonic constraints. A much simpler and straightforward approach for a subset of cases that violate the SCC determines the parameters that produce our desired solution where the …rm's quantities correspond to marginal-cost pricing while maximizing the economic surplus. If the …rm succeeds in capturing the entire 4 The assumption is in the spirit of the literature on self-control and temptation reviewed and extended by Dhar and Wertenbroch (2012) . It is also consistent with the H-consumer described by Haws and Winter (2013) where the "presence of supersized pricing automatically activates the focus on getting a deal" (p. 50). 5 Araujo and Moreira (2010) and Araujo, Moreira, and Vieira (2015) extend Wilson's (1993) demand pro…le approach to the case that violates the SCC.
surplus, the solution must also be consistent with pro…t maximization.
Let the production cost be linear. Therefore, without loss of generality, assume M C(Q) = 1 (Q = q i ).
Under the Revelation Principle (Myerson, 1979) , we can concentrate only on the case where the buyer pays menu price T P t (q t ) for quantity q t . As we have only two types of consumers, we will consider only two menu prices: T P L (q L ) and T P H (q H ).
Let U t (T P j ; q j ) be the utility of type-t buyers from consuming q j and paying T P j (q j ); t 2 fL; Hg, j 2 fL; Hg. The …rm's objective function is to maximize its expected pro…t per consumer subject to individual rationality constraints and the incentive compatible constraints.
where represents the expected pro…t per consumer; IR L and IR H are the individual rationality constraints indicating that consumers will buy the product only if their utilities from the exchange are non-negative; ICC L and ICC H are the incentive compatibility constraints requiring that neither type will pretend to be the other type and buy the other's quantity.
there exists i) a separating equilibrium, ii) where the …rm sets menu quantities that maximize the total economic surplus, and iii) in which the …rm captures the entire surplus.
B) the di¤erence in price between the price that the H-type pays compared to what the L-type pays divided by the di¤erence in quantity is always less than the marginal cost. Namely, the 'marginal price'is less than the marginal cost.
6 All results are independent of the units of measurement including money because the results are determined by ratios and the normalized marginal cost of 1.
As the proof is constructive, it gives insight about quantity and price and also the relationship between menu prices and two-part tari¤s. Consider the following claim:
; the quantity and menu price are equivalent to a two-part tari¤ in a hypothetical market with only the L-types. Therefore price equals marginal cost (p = 1 = M C), and the transfer price equals the L-type consumer surplus (
, the quantity and menu price are equivalent to a twopart tari¤ in a hypothetical market with only H-types. Therefore, price equals marginal cost (p = 1 = M C), and the transfer price equals the H-type consumer surplus (T H = CS H (p = 1)), i.e., T P H (q H ) = 1 q H (p = 1) + T H ; and U H (P H ; q H ) = 0.
Claims 1 and 2 are apparent and intuitive. The nontrivial part is to develop the conditions for which none of the types will buy the menu of the others so that the ICCs are satis…ed (see Claims 4 and 5).
, where q 0 is the quantity that the L-type will buy if the price is zero.
Note that, if the price is zero, the L-type
: Claim 3 is a technical one that prevents the need to divide the proof into two cases (the other in which q H < q 0 ). Claim 3 is more applicable to fast food where consumption is usually immediate but it may not hold for other goods 7 .
Claim 4 If
Claims 4 and 5 are easier to satisfy (see Appendix) under menu pricing compared to two-part tari¤s. By preventing consumers from choosing quantities under the same transfer price, menu prices are more e¤ective for the …rm than two-part tari¤s (Wolfstetter, 1999) , and also very applicable to fast food.
Claim 6 establishes the condition in which part B of Theorem 1 is satis…ed and creates the perception to consumers that 'marginal price'is less than the marginal cost.
7 For example, the U.S. clothing chain Jos A Bank is well-known for its quantity discounts such as "buy one suit at the regular price and get two free". L-types can enjoy the bene…ts of the other two suits at later dates (so that we do not observe a separate L-type menu). For fast food, with its immediate consumption property, the L-type is less likely to buy and save excess amounts even at a zero price.
< 1, namely, the di¤erence in menu price divided by the di¤erence in quantity is less than the marginal cost (proof in the Appendix).
Theorem 1 easily derives from a reorganization of the conditions for Claims 3-6.
To interpret the su¢ cient conditions for Theorem 1, consider the inequality (
Here, the ratio of the slope of the H to L demands, must be greater than the square of the ratio of their maximum willingness-to-pay for the good, considering the normalized marginal cost This will ensure that the Lmenu price will be less than the H-menu price but that the di¤erence is limited. The inequality
g ensures that the L-type will not pretend to be an H-type as the H-type's demand slope leads to a large quantity that the L-type will not consume. The inequality, 2a H < a L + 1; sets the requirement for the maximum willingness-to-pay so that the H-type will not pretend to be an L-type for a small quantity.
These conditions are illustrated in Figure 1 using the parameters of our initial example. They can be seen as representing DG's 'disciplined'and 'tempted'consumers. The L-type (disciplined) is willing to pay a relatively high unit price and the rate of increase in her consumer surplus from a higher quantity is initially greater than that of the H-type (tempted); and vice-versa at higher quantities. Our example and Theorem 1 violate the Spence-Mirrlees condition. Increasing the quantity bene…ts the L-type more than H-type initially and vice versa at the higher quantity, leading to TPs ($15 and $12 in our example) that are relatively close, and where q L is much smaller than q H . This creates the perception that marginal price is much less than marginal cost.
A model that violates the SCC is especially relevant to the fast food industry which has targeted lowerincome, minority neighborhoods (Meltzer and Shuetz, 2012; Jou, 2017) . In our example, the L-type is willing to pay a price of $12 for the smaller 4 unit quantity, behavior that may be more representative of higher income consumers. In contrast, the H-type are only willing to pay $7.5 for 4 units but up to $15 for 10 units. This behavior may be more commonly associated with lower-income consumers.
The Right-to-Split
Various market failures associated with junk food, especially with supersized portions, have been used to justify public health e¤orts to reduce food portion sizes in general and promote a variety of downsizing policy strategies. These include reducing food portion and packaging sizes; restricting advertising of highly sweetened products with low nutritional value to children; and restricting both the promotion of supersized portions and the price discounts associated with them (Marteau et al., 2015) . Most of the regulatory and voluntary initiatives that have been adopted, however, relate to food labelling and the posting of caloric and nutritional information on products, menus, or menu boards. In the United States, many restaurants post such information even where it is not mandated. Mexico, in response to its obesity epidemic, introduced a one peso per liter SSB tax in January 2014.
The tax is roughly 9 percent of average retail price. Grogger's (2015) preliminary work shows that prices of regular sodas increased by 12-14 percent relative to other beverages right after the tax. With a unitary price elasticity for SSBs in Mexico (Colchero et al., 2015) , consumption of SSBs can be signi…cantly impacted through tax policy. Also on a national scale, the United Kingdom recently announced a tax on the production of sugar-containing soft drinks. E¤ective January 2018, the novel two-tiered tax increases with sugar content.
In our simple example, a unit tax up to $0.22 on the large portion will not disturb the separating equilibrium in which the …rm captures the entire consumer surplus (minus the tax) but it will reduce the large portion to 7.8 units with T P H = $12.55 which is greater than the maximum of $12.5 that L is willing to pay.
Eliminating "supersizing" by requiring the store to sell only one size will lead our …rm to set a T P = $12.5 so that the L-type does not drop out. To get T P = $12.5 for the H-type requires a quantity of 7.75
units. The L-type disposes 2.75 units and total pro…t is $9.5. Interestingly, the …rm could get around such a regulation and even do better by o¤ering a quantity of 5 units with T P = $12.5 but with free re…lls even in 5-unit portions. The L-type will not re…ll; the H-type re…lls once and total pro…t is $10. (The total pro…t = $12.3 with a re…ll size of 2.75).
These interventions are highly impractical, di¢ cult to enforce, and would be regarded by many as coercive.
The inherent arbitrariness of de…ning products and businesses subject to taxes or limits can also create legal barriers as with the New York City proposal (Min 2013) . Instead, we focus on adding a new intervention that we de…ne as the "right-to-split." Consider two variants of this right:
1. A "strong right-to-split" where a customer would be able to buy half the large portion for half the price assuming that half portions or less are on the menu. This approach corresponds to what is called proportional or linear pricing in the public health literature. A "weak right-to-split"where a customer would be able to buy the large quantity and have it divided 8 Vermeer and colleagues (2009, 2014) conducted experimental studies in the Netherlands at di¤erent settings such as a fast food restaurant and worksite cafeteria. The authors found that proportional pricing in a fast food setting did not have substantial e¤ects but that overweight customers were more likely to choose smaller portions.
(and packaged) into two, i.e., a form of plate-sharing. For simplicity, we assume that the marginal cost of splitting the transaction is zero.
The Bloomberg soda regulation did not prohibit establishments from posting a price for a 32 ounce soda portion if it were packaged into two of the maximum allowable 16 ounce cups. This practice would be consistent with the weak right-to-split. The strong version would enable the customer to buy a 16 ounce drink at half the large serving price.
Consider …rst the strong version. This will break the separating equilibrium under which the …rm can extract the entire consumer surplus from both consumers. The reasoning is well-developed in Alger's (1999) extensive analyses of multiple and joint purchases. Assume a consumer is allowed to buy any proportion at a proportional price where price per unit in the menu price exceeds the consumer's marginal bene…t. Then the consumer will prefer to buy a smaller portion. This behavior will lead the …rm to set the standard monopoly solution, a result that applies even to a single consumer type. In our more restrictive intervention, if the …rm intends to serve the two consumer types, it will at a minimum leave some consumer surplus for at least one type and/or reduce the portion size for at least one type. Now consider the weak version. To be relevant, there must be more than one consumer in the transaction.
DG actually discuss the sharing of supersized meals among family and friends. If supersizing is banned, DG claim the …rm may circumvent the ban by o¤ering multiples at reduced prices. If the …rm o¤ers such deals, L-types can take advantage by sharing with family and friends.
Within the context of our model, suppose that the L and H-types can cooperate. At a $15 total price, the H-type can split the 10 unit portion with the L-type so that both gain because the L-type is willing to pay up to $12.5 for 5 units and the H-type is willing to pay up to $8.75. Their respective consumer surpluses would be $5 and $1.25 if they split the bill at $7.5 each. Of course, where we have more L-types, they could cooperate by splitting the H-menu and even two H-types could bene…t by splitting the H-menu.
If cooperation were common among a …rm's customers, this again would break the separating equilibrium where the quantities correspond to P = M C for each type and the …rm captures the entire surplus.
CONCLUSION
We introduced a simple linear model for a …rm with market power facing two types of consumers where consumer type is private information. Without dealing with the mathematical complexities associated with pro…t maximization under nonlinear and nonmonotonic constraints, we show the su¢ cient conditions for separating the two types and where the …rm can capture the entire consumer surplus associated with marginal-cost pricing. We then show how this leads to value size pricing and the mythical discount associated with supersizing, even though the …rm does not sell below marginal cost. There is no need for any rational addiction or other strategies to generate this bargain price. Our model is constructive and shows the derivation of quantities and the total menu prices.
We consider di¤erent interventions and introduce the right-to-split as an alternative. Consistent with policy goals, either the strong or the weak versions (or both) will likely reduce the supersized portions.
Currently, in the United States, there are no clear practices on such splitting and it is possible that many consumers are too embarrassed to request split portions.
From a small convenience sample of consumers in Minnesota, O'Dougherty et al. (2006) found that 57 percent of survey participants somewhat or strongly opposed legislation that would force restaurants to o¤er better prices on smaller portions. Regulatory interventions, including the Bloomberg soda ban or taxation of soda, have not received broad public support (Min 2013) . To counter the temptation created by value size pricing, public health education and other e¤orts to pressure restaurants to reduce portion sizes, or to make it more acceptable for consumers to shamelessly request split portions or plate-sharing, could encourage the availability of downsized options at downsized prices.
Appendix: Proofs of Claims 4-6
Proof of claim 4
is the willingness to pay of the L type for the quantity of the H type (notice claim 3). Therefore,
As it left to show that U L (T P H ; q H ) < 0; then
Proof of claim 5
As T P H (q H ) = 1 q H (p = 1)+CS H (p = 1), then U H (T P H ; q H ) = 0. It is left to show that U H (T P L ; q L ) <
(a L 1)) (a L + 1) < 0:
Proof of claim 6
Observe that:
